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Abstract 
In Nebraska, variations of similar bills, such as carryover LB 447, attempting to amend 
mandatory minimum laws in the state have been introduced in recent years. The harshness of the 
mandatory sentences still in effect, as well as the looming state of emergency caused by 
overcrowding in prisons, have caused the debate over sentencing laws to persist. This essay 
identifies the core issues of mandatory minimum sentencing laws and analyzes the states of 
Nebraska, Texas, Alabama, California, and the federal system’s use of mandatory minimums for 
felony charges to identify potential solutions. Statute review found that Nebraska’s current 
sentencing codes are misaligned with the rest of the nation; not even Alabama with one of the 
harshest penal codes in the Unites States uses mandatory minimums for their habitual criminal 
statutes. Of the penal codes that included mandatory minimum language, additional language 
was included to provide protections from harsh sentencing practices. When drafting legislation, 
Nebraska law-makers should consider the following recommendations. Looking to the practices 
of Texas and California, Nebraska should rid the penal code of mandatory minimum language to 
allow for a system entrenched in judicial discretion. To ensure violent offenders receive 
necessary programming before reentering the community, Nebraska could prohibit probation for 
certain crimes or felony classifications, similar to California’s penal code. Nebraska could also 
adopt the federal system of using a “safety valve” relief mechanism that allows for prosecutorial 
discretion while maintaining clear guidelines and requirements. As for mandatory minimums 
attached to habitual criminal laws, Senator Pansing-Brooks bill, LB 1013, or one similar to 
California’s Proposition 36, should be reconsidered by the legislature. Finally, Nebraska should 
watch out for any reactionary legislation to certain offenses; as seen by Alabama’s mandatory 
minimum bill regarding trafficking in fentanyl, this type of legislation costs the state money and 
puts non-violent offenders in prison for longer.  
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Introduction 
The questions surrounding mandatory minimum sentencing laws become the topic of 
debate anytime overcrowding in prisons, budgets, or criminal justice reform is discussed. Here in 
Nebraska, variations of similar bills attempting to amend mandatory minimum laws ine state 
have been introduced in recent years. Currently, carryover bill 447 has made waves by setting 
out to drastically change mandatory minimum sentences in Nebraska. The amended, toned-down 
LB 447 has been indefinitely postponed, and its goal to eradicate the terminology from 
Nebraska’s penal code has been discontinued. The mandatory sentences still in effect, as well as 
the looming state of emergency caused by overcrowding in the prisons, have caused the debate 
over sentencing laws to persist. This essay aims to identify the core issues of mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws and analyze the states of Nebraska, Texas, Alabama, California, and 
the federal system’s use of mandatory minimums for felony charges to identify potential 
solutions. 
Terms Defined 
The United States Sentencing Commission defines a United States’ mandatory minimum 
sentencing law as “a federal criminal statute requiring, upon conviction of a federal criminal 
offense and the satisfaction of criteria set forth in that statute, the imposition of a specified 
minimum term of imprisonment” (2011). Mandatory minimums are meant to prohibit judges 
from giving probation to those convicted of designated crimes. Upon conviction of one of these 
felonies, judges are required to sentence the defendant to a certain amount of time in prison, no 
matter the individual circumstances. Most states, including the four in this analysis, utilize a 
similar definition. While mandatory minimum fines, mandatory minimum terms of probation, 
and other mandatory sentencing provisions do exist, mandatory minimum sentences for the 
purpose of this paper will always refer to terms of imprisonment.  
Minimum punishments that do not include the word “mandatory” in their statute act as 
sentencing guidelines. Sentencing guidelines provide judges an acceptable range of potential 
penalties for a certain crime or criminal classification. However, without the word “mandatory”, 
judges are able to impose lesser sentences if they deem it appropriate. Additionally, mandatory 
minimums usually prohibit parole or the ability to obtain good time while in prison, a feature not 
shared by sentencing guidelines. The United States Sentencing Commission describes sentencing 
guidelines as “designed to be flexible and therefore assign varying weight to aggravating and 
mitigating factors in the context of the offense and the guidelines as a whole” (2011). This 
flexibility and capacity to consider the whole context is referred to as judicial discretion and is 
the ability of judges to have control over each individual case and sentence. Mandatory 
minimum sentences limit judicial discretion by taking the choice out their potential sentencing 
judgement. Guidelines, especially federal sentencing guidelines, act in a similar fashion to 
mandatory minimums. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 helped develop federal sentencing 
guidelines used today; it requires that the guidelines consider: 
 ‘the nature and degree of the harm caused by the offense,’ ‘the community view of the 
gravity of the offense,’ ‘the public concern generated by the offense,’ ‘the deterrent effect 
a particular sentence may have on the commission of the offense by others,’ and ‘the 
current incidence of the offense in the community and in the Nation as a whole’ (The 
United States Sentencing Commission, 2011; 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)).  
These considerations are used to “measure the relative seriousness of the offense” to find an 
appropriate punishment (The United States Sentencing Commission, 2011). 
Mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines have been found to identify the same 
aggravating factors when indicating why a lengthier sentence is necessary. This identification 
process produces a comparable higher-penalty effect; sentencing guidelines will actively 
promote the imposition of a higher sentence when an aggravating factor is present, similar to 
mandatory minimums. However, sentencing guidelines take into consideration the entire context 
of the case, including offense and offender-specific factors; mandatory minimums only take into 
account the aggravating factor (The United States Sentencing Commission, 2011).  
The History of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Laws 
Mandatory minimum sentences have been around since our nation’s inception and were 
traditionally used for “a core set of serious offenses, such as murder and treason, and also [were] 
enacted to address immediate problems and exigencies” (The United States Sentencing 
Commission, 2011). In 1951, the use of mandatory minimums shifted in three recognizable 
ways: 
1) Congress added more mandatory minimums to the United States’ Code 
2) They expanded mandatory minimum penalties to apply to drug crimes, firearms, 
sex offenses, and child sex offenses 
3) The average length of the mandatory period of incarceration was increased (The 
United States Sentencing Commission, 2011; Robertson, 2013) 
In the 1980’s, President Ronald Reagan sought to pursue “tough-on-crime” policies for the 
criminal justice system (Caulkins et. al., 1997). National events helped push his initiative into the 
spot light, such as the death of star basketball player, Len Bias. Bias was set to lead the Celtics 
after being the second pick in the NBA’s 1986 draft. He died of cocaine intoxication in 1986, 
which sparked national debates on the devastating problem of drug use and addiction in the 
United States (Weinreb, n.d.). Congressional members on both sides of the aisle were seemingly 
overwhelmed by Bias’s death and the resulting public outcry. Dan Baum, in his book Smoke and 
Mirrors, refers to Len Bias as “the Archduke Ferdinand of the Total War on Drugs”, referring to 
his role in the start of a new era in drug prosecution and mandatory minimum penalties (1996). 
Lawmakers used Len Bias throughout their narratives, as well as Don Rogers, a safety for the 
Cleveland Browns who died of cocaine intoxication shortly after Bias (Weinreb, n.d.). They used 
the deaths of these players to make emotional appeals and expedite the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986. The United States Sentencing Commission details the passage of the Act by saying: 
Because of the heightened concern and national sense of urgency surrounding drugs 
generally and crack cocaine specifically, Congress bypassed much of its usual 
deliberative legislative process. As a result, Congress held no committee hearings and 
produced no reports related to the 1986 Act (2011). 
The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation (CJPF) examined how this Act increased the mandatory 
minimum sentences for many drug crimes, including five years of imprisonment for being in 
possession of “five grams of crack, 500 grams of cocaine, one kilogram of heroin, 40 grams of a 
substance with a detectable amount of fentanyl, 5 grams of methamphetamine, 100 kilograms or 
100 plants of marijuana, and other drugs” (n.d.). The difference in treatment of crack cocaine and 
cocaine during the 1980’s through the 2000’s was referred to as the “100-1” ratio and was 
rationalized by lawmakers through the idea that crack cocaine was “more dangerous than powder 
cocaine” and had an “especially deleterious effects on the communities where it was becoming 
increasingly prevalent” (The United States Sentencing Commission, 2011).  
The targeting of crack cocaine had an immediate racial effect. As crack cocaine is a 
cheaper variation and option to powder cocaine, its users tend to come from lower socio-
economic communities. A study by CJPF found that older generations of Black Americans, who 
would have already been adults during the 1980’s, are more likely to have tried crack cocaine 
than their White counterparts (2012). But even now, there is a high racial disproportionality 
among crack cocaine users. Blacks made up around 37% of crack users in 2012 but were only 
12.2% of the population (The United States Sentencing Commission, 2013). 
After the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was fully integrated into the legal system, drug crimes 
became the most common offense in federal courts (Miller, 1995). An increasing number of 
studies found racial biases in the prosecution of crack cocaine immediately following the 
implementation of the Act. For instance, Berk and Campbell found a disproportionate number of 
African Americans in federal crack cocaine cases compared to state arrests, while there were no 
Whites charged with selling crack in federal court over the same four-year period (1993). 
Outside of crack cocaine convictions alone, the Act, along with the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984, was found to cause overall racial and ethnic disparities in the imposition of prison time and 
sentence length. From 1989-1990, Black and Hispanic offenders were 6-13% more likely to be 
imprisoned than White offenders, and Blacks were sentenced an average of 21 additional months 
than White offenders (Hispanic offenders were comparable to Whites in this section) (McDonald 
& Carlson, 1993). Advocacy groups such as Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) 
formed in the 1990’s and spoke out, with the help of researchers and scholars, against these 
sentencing laws. One such scholar, Marvin D. Free Jr., compiled the instances of racial disparity 
in the criminal justice system, from arrests to sentencing and mandatory minimum penalties. He 
suggested that the law should be changed to “make penalties for identical amounts of powder 
and crack cocaine the same” to reduce racial bias, though he noted this could not be the entire 
solution as it did not account for drug enforcement in lower socio-economic neighborhoods 
predominately comprised of minorities (Free, 1997).  
In 2010, through the Fair Sentencing Act, Congress amended the mandatory minimum 
sentences for crack cocaine by raising the quantity for five- and ten-year mandatory terms of 
imprisonment to 28 and 280 grams, respectively. Similar to the passing of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986, there was bipartisan support for the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 as criticism of 
sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimums came from all types of constituents. Despite this 
change, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act continues to act as a base for mandatory minimum sentences in 
federal courts (The United States Sentencing Commission, 2011).  
Nebraska’s Mandatory Minimum Statutes 
Nebraska Revised Statutes § 28-105 (1) designates that Class IC and ID felonies carry 
mandatory minimum penalties of five years imprisonment and three years imprisonment, 
respectively. Similar to the federal code, Nebraska defines mandatory sentencing as “a person 
convicted of a felony for which a mandatory minimum sentence is prescribed shall not be 
eligible for probation” (Neb. Rev. Statutes § 28-105 (4)). The annotations in Neb. Rev. Statutes § 
28-416 specify that mandatory minimum penalties for felonies “affects both probation and parole 
. . . the offender will not receive any good time credit until the full amount of the mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment has been served”. This means if an offender is convicted of a 
crime which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years imprisonment, they are required 
to complete a minimum of 25 years in prison before they are eligible for parole (State v. Russell, 
2015).  
Class IC felonies are as follows: 
For drug crimes, as written in Neb. Rev. Statutes § 28-416 (7-10), being in possession of: 
At least twenty-eight grams but less than one hundred forty grams [of cocaine] (Neb. 
Rev. Statutes § 
At least twenty-eight grams but less than one hundred forty grams shall [of crack 
cocaine]  
At least twenty-eight grams but less than one hundred forty grams [of heroin]  
At least twenty-eight grams but less than one hundred forty grams [of amphetamine, its 
salts, optical isomers, and salts of its isomers, or with respect to methamphetamine, its 
salts, optical isomers, and salts of its isomers]  
For crimes involving firearms, as written in Neb. Rev. § Statutes 28-1205 (c) and § 28-
1212.04: 
The use of a deadly weapon, which is a firearm, to commit a felony  
Any person, within the territorial boundaries of any city of the first class or county 
containing a city of the metropolitan class or primary class, who unlawfully, knowingly, 
and intentionally or recklessly discharges a firearm, while in any motor vehicle or in the 
proximity of any motor vehicle that such person has just exited, at or in the general 
direction of any person, dwelling, building, structure, occupied motor vehicle, occupied 
aircraft, inhabited motor home as defined in section 71-4603, or inhabited camper unit as 
defined in section 60-1801 
Class ID felonies are as follows: 
For drug crimes, as written in Neb. Rev. Statute 28-416 (7-10), being in possession of: 
 At least ten grams but less than twenty-eight grams [of cocaine] 
 At least ten grams but less than twenty-eight grams [of crack cocaine] 
At least ten grams but less than twenty-eight grams [of heroin] 
At least ten grams but less than twenty-eight grams [of amphetamine, its salts, optical 
isomers, and salts of its isomers, or with respect to methamphetamine, its salts, optical 
isomers, and salts of its isomers]  
For a crime involving the use of electronic devices in sexual assault, as written in Neb. 
Rev. Statute 28-320.02 (1-2):  
No person shall knowingly solicit, coax, entice, or lure (a) a child sixteen years of age or 
younger or (b) a peace officer who is believed by such person to be a child sixteen years 
of age or younger, by means of an electronic communication device as that term is 
defined in section 28-833, to engage in an act which would be in violation of section 28-
319, 28-319.01, or 28-320.01 or subsection (1) or (2) of section 28-320 
For crimes regarding visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, as written in Neb. 
Rev. Statutes § 28-1463.03 and .04: 
It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly make, publish, direct, create, provide, or in 
any manner generate any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct which has a child 
as one of its participants or portrayed observers. 
It shall be unlawful for a person knowingly to purchase, rent, sell, deliver, distribute, 
display for sale, advertise, trade, or provide to any person any visual depiction of sexually 
explicit conduct which has a child as one of its participants or portrayed observers. 
It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly employ, force, authorize, induce, or 
otherwise cause a child to engage in any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct 
which has a child as one of its participants or portrayed observers. 
Any person who is nineteen years of age or older at the time he or she violates this 
section will be guilty of a Class ID felony for each offense 
For a crime involving some form of first-degree assault, as written in Neb. Rev. Statute § 
28-929 (2): 
Assault on an officer, an emergency responder, a state correctional employee, a 
Department of Health and Human Services employee, or a health care professional in the 
first degree shall 
For some crimes involving firearms, as written in Neb. Rev. Statutes § 28-1206 (3) and § 
28-1212.02: 
Possession of a deadly weapon which is a firearm by a prohibited person is a Class ID 
felony for a first offense 
Any person who unlawfully and intentionally discharges a firearm at an inhabited 
dwelling house, occupied building, occupied motor vehicle, occupied aircraft, inhabited 
motor home as defined in section 71-4603, or inhabited camper unit as defined in section 
60-1801 
While it is generally only IC and ID felonies that carry mandatory minimum penalties, there are 
certain higher level—IB—crimes that have been specifically designated to carry lengthy 
mandatory minimum sentences. Sexual assault of a child in the first degree is one such crime and 
carries a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years upon the first conviction (Neb. Rev. 
Statutes § 28-319.01 (2)).  
Nebraska also has a version of habitual offender mandatory sentencing enhancements. 
Neb. Rev. Statutes § 29-221 details the base habitual criminal classification, which carries a 10-
year mandatory minimum, is defined as: 
Whoever has been twice convicted of a crime, sentenced, and committed to prison, in this 
or any other state or by the United States or once in this state and once at least in any 
other state or by the United States, for terms of not less than one year 
Other offenses only take a second conviction to trigger a mandatory minimum. In these cases, 
many increase the crime’s class after a second offense of a similar nature, like raising a Class II 
felony to a Class IC felony in order to have the mandatory minimum penalty applied. Neb. Rev. 
Statutes § 28-813.01 (c) states that any person who has previously been convicted of a 
knowingly possessing a visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a child, or a 
similar crime, shall be guilty of a Class IC felony and sentenced to a mandatory minimum of a 
five- year term of imprisonment.  
In more severe instances of crimes regarding sexual assault, the Nebraska penal code 
raises both the crime classification and mandatory penalty. For instance: 
Any person who is found guilty of second degree sexual assault of a child under this 
section and who has previously been convicted (a) under this section, (b) under section 
28-319 of first degree or attempted first degree sexual assault, (c) under section 28-
319.01 for first degree or attempted first degree sexual assault of a child, or (d) in any 
other state or federal court under laws with essentially the same elements as this section, 
section 28-319, or section 28-319.01 shall be guilty of a Class IC felony and shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of twenty-five years in prison (Neb. Rev. 
Statutes § 28-320.01 (4)).  
Finally, Neb. Rev. Statutes § 28-319 (3) additionally discusses the second time penalty for sexual 
assault in the first degree; it does not raise the classification, but plainly states a mandatory 
minimum term of twenty-five years in prison. Overall, Nebraska’s mandatory minimums affect 
drug crimes, child sex crimes, offenses including firearms, and habitual offender or second time 
offender issues.  
The Current Debate 
In 2017, State Senator Ernie Chambers introduced LB 447, a bill designed to get rid of 
the language for IC and ID felonies indicating a mandatory minimum for any crime within these 
classifications. The bill’s Statement of Intent is as follows:  
This bill eliminates selected mandatory minimum sentences under section 28-105 by 
removing the word "mandatory" from the description of authorized penalties for Class IC 
and Class ID felonies. The sentencing range remains 5 to 50 years and 3 to 50 years, 
respectively. As drafted, mandatory minimums remain for 1st degree sexual assault (28-
319), and sexual assault of a child (28-319.01 and 28-320.01 (2017). 
Chambers lists several reasons for introducing LB 447, including a lack of evidence showing a 
deterrent effect, mandatory minimum sentences’ role in continued overcrowding in prisons, and 
their removal of good behavior incentives for inmates the misuse of prosecutorial power. While 
introducing his bill to the Judiciary Committee, Chambers commented: 
Mandatory minimums do not protect the public. Mandatory minimums do not deter 
crimes. Those who commit crimes don't know what the penalty is, so they don't plan to 
get caught, they don't expect to get caught, so there can be no deterrence whatsoever 
(Judiciary Committee, 2017) 
He later cited his and fellow senators’ inability to pick out an offense and know the potential 
punishment off the top of their head. His logic is that if they do not know the designated penalty, 
neither would potential offenders. Fran Kaye, an English and Ethnic Studies professor at the 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln and 20-year active volunteer in Nebraska prisons echoed 
Chamber’s thoughts in a one-on-one interview. She argued, “they don’t know the laws, they 
don’t know if they’re going to be charged with a Class IV felony or a Class II felony, they don’t 
know what has a mandatory minimum and what does” (F. Kaye, personal communication, 
February 23, 2017). If Fran Kaye and Senator Chamber’s arguments hold true for the majority of 
offenders, it would seriously undermine the potential for an existing deterrent effect from 
mandatory minimums. Corey O’Brien, the Criminal Bureau Chief of the Nebraska Attorney 
General's Office, maintains that he has witnessed the deterrent effect of mandatory minimums. 
He spoke about how he has seen sex offender chat rooms, and when a police officer pretending 
to be a child asks to meet up, often times, the adult will say no and give the reason that they 
know they will go to prison if they do. He argued their outwardness about fearing prison time 
proves a deterrent effect which, in turn, saves children’s livelihoods. This is O’Brien’s most cited 
reason for supporting mandatory minimums. He said, “If I prevent one child from getting 
victimized by a would-be offender because he knew he might go to prison—he would definitely 
go to prison if he touched that child—mandatory minimums are worth their weight in gold” (C. 
O’Brien, personal communication, February 21, 2017). When Fran Kaye was made aware of this 
statement, she contested that people believe they would go to prison for certain offenses due to 
common sense, not because of the existence of specific mandatory minimum penalties (F. Kaye, 
personal communication, February 23, 2017). That is, the potential sex offenders indicated they 
thought they would go to prison because it is common sense that a child sex offender, if 
convicted, would not be placed on probation and immediately released back into the community. 
Chambers also asserted mandatory minimums lead to overcrowding in Nebraska prisons, 
an issue becoming increasingly substantial in Nebraska. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 
found that Nebraska is ranked second in overcrowding, both when compared to other states and 
the federal prison system. The Nebraska prison population in 2016 was at 126.2% capacity when 
observed at its highest potential capacity (Carson, 2018). Highest potential capacity is defined by 
BJS as “[t]he maximum number of beds reported across the three capacity measures: design, 
operational, and rated capacity” meaning 126.2% was the lowest potential percentage over-
capacity that Nebraska prisons could mathematically be (Carson, 18). BJS found Nebraska’s 
over-capacity range was 126.2% to 157.8% in 2016 (Carson, 2018). The persistent problem with 
overcrowding in prisons was, arguably, one of the factors that led to multiple riots at the 
Tecumseh State Correctional Institution in 2015 and 2017.  The combination of these two 
horrific riots resulted in over $2.5 million dollars in damage and the death of four inmates 
(Duggan and Hammel, 2017; State Ombudsman’s Office, 2015). These events and ongoing 
issues with overcrowding have caused policy makers to introduce several pieces of legislation 
aiming to form a complete solution, one of which is Chamber’s LB 447. Those on both sides of 
the mandatory minimum debate acknowledge the existence of the sentencing law’s role in the 
overcrowding of Nebraska prisons; they do, however, disagree as to the extent of this role. While 
Senator Chambers believes mandatory minimums have a significant effect on overcrowding 
because it keeps offenders in prison for longer, others, such as Corey O’Brien and former 
prosecutor and State Senator Paul Schumacher assert that getting rid of mandatory minimums 
would have little to no effect on overcrowding (Judiciary Committee, 2017). 
Paul Schumacher also introduced a bill in 2017 regarding mandatory minimums, LB 53. 
While this bill has been indefinitely postponed, Schumacher aimed to reduce the effect of 
mandatory minimums and bring in more judicial discretion by enacting a three-judge panel for 
convictions of offenses with the mandatory minimum penalty attached. He also stated his support 
for LB 447 and noted he believes fully eradicating mandatory sentences is the most ideal path to 
a solution (P. Schumacher, personal communication, February 22, 2017). Despite this, 
Schumacher does not think getting rid of mandatory terminology will have a significant effect on 
the prison population. He instead commented on what he feels are issues that have a higher 
contribution to the overcrowding issue than mandatory minimums, including the underfunding of 
mental health care, and budgeting of the prison system (P. Schumacher, personal 
communication, February 22, 2017).  
It is difficult to say with certainty how much prison overpopulation would be affected if 
mandatory minimum sentences were removed from the penal code. While the number of 
offenders in prison for Class IC and ID offenses are known, it is not a given that they would be 
granted probation if there was just a minimum guideline. However, they would be eligible for 
parole and good time and would therefore be release earlier than they currently would be. Corey 
O’Brien, acknowledging the potential of LB 447 to help with prison populations, contended: 
While certainly elimination of mandatory minimums could potentially alleviate some of 
the current overcrowding . . . . this would amount to nothing more than a drop in the 
bucket. And for what benefits the elimination of these did yield would be drastically 
offset by the additional threats to public safety that the potentially earlier release of these 
inmates can now pose (C. O’Brien, personal communication, February 21, 2017). 
Corey O’ Brien explained that he believes if mandatory minimums do not exist, judges will be 
more inclined to give out probation to first time offenders, even with the most heinous crimes. 
State Senator Steve Halloran also questioned LB 447 on the grounds of public safety. During the 
introductory hearing on the bill, he noted, “for the protection of the citizenry, if someone is a 
repeat offender and they're in prison...there is that safeguard that they won't be committing that 
crime during the term that they're in prison” (Judiciary Committee, 2017). The public is indeed 
protected from any potential crimes a particular offender may commit during their period of 
incarceration. However, Fran Kaye refuted this idea by discussing the lack of rehabilitation in 
prisons and how mandatory minimums can lead to higher rates of recidivism. She explained: 
Sentences that are too long are our problem and mandatory minimums only result in 
sentences that are longer than necessary to punish offenders or to deter others from 
committing similar crimes . . . . people who are incarcerated for too long are much less 
likely to be successful in working their way back into society, so mandatory minimums 
that keep people in too long actually lead to more crime and more recidivism (Judiciary 
Committee, 2017). 
There is some evidence to support larger rates of recidivism after periods of imprisonment 
compared to probation or community supervision. Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson (2009) conducted 
one such study and found incarceration to have a mild criminogenic effect—an increase in the 
chance for recidivism due to “anti-social prison experiences or to stigma endured upon release.” 
However, they noted the “mild” effect on recidivism rates was not strong enough to base policy 
change on, although they did find evidence depicting a lack of a deterrence from incarceration 
(Nagin et. Al., 2009).  During offenders’ stay in prisons, Senator Chamber’s also claims, the 
ability to obtain “good time” for early release or parole is “ a management tool used by the 
prisons to be an inventive for convicts to behave” (Judiciary Committee, 2017). He argues it 
removes the incentives for good behavior, so those who are serving a mandatory minimum term 
of imprisonment do not care about their behavior which puts the safety of correctional officers, 
other inmates, and the atmosphere of the prison is at risk. This negative attitude can contribute to 
the criminogenic effect of incarceration as laid out by Nagin et. al. (2009).  
Outside of legislative hearings, Attorney General Doug Peterson continued the use 
rhetoric regarding the preservation of public safety; the Omaha World Herald quoted him saying 
“the removal of the mandatory minimum terms would have a detrimental effect on public safety 
by potentially allowing the some of the worst offenders to return to Nebraska’s communities in a 
shorter period of time or avoid prison entirely” (Omaha World Herald, 2017). The editorial 
continued, “these aren’t non-violent drug users who pose little threat. These are the people 
Nebraskans pay taxes to keep behind bars” (Omaha World Herald, 2017). Corey O’Brien has 
even said that he does not care about drug crimes and their mandatory sentences, but cares about 
“the ones where there’s victims or the ones where there’s violence, or the one’s where there’s 
firearms involved because these are the offenders that should be going to prison” (C. O’Brien, 
personal communication, February 21, 2017). However, many of the IC and ID felonies that 
would be affected by LB 447 are non-violent drug crimes, and the majority of the violent, sexual 
crimes O’Brien and Peterson refer to would be practically unaffected if the bill were to pass as is, 
especially after AM 546, an amendment reducing the scope of LB 447, was accepted. This is 
unlikely, however, as LB 447 has been indefinitely postponed.  
O’Brien added additional reasons he cannot support eradicating mandatory minimums; he 
believes that without mandatory minimums, the system is left open to biased decisions (C. 
O’Brien, personal communication, February 21, 2017). His testimony during the Judicial 
Committee (2017) hearing included a hypothetical scenario: 
There are cases where a judge might have two defendants who committed the same crime 
and are facing the same charges. One might be upper middle class who can afford a better 
lawyer than a lower-class defendant who has a public defender swamped with cases. In 
another case, one defendant might be white while the other is a minority. The judge may 
give the upper middle class and the white defendants a lesser sentence because of 
subconscious biases, or socioeconomic beliefs. 
To summarize, O’Brien is referring to the potential for judicial bias and asserts that mandatory 
minimums promote consistency among sentencing. That said, other issues arise when power is 
placed in the hands of the prosecutor. During the same legislative hearing, Senator Chambers 
said, “prosecutors misuse the system to make their job easier” (Judiciary Committee, 2017). 
Spike Eickholt, who testified on the behalf of Nebraska Criminal Defense Attorneys Association 
and the ACLU of Nebraska, detailed how prosecutors in Nebraska use the threat of mandatory 
minimum penalties to secure plea deals, as it gives them leverage during negotiations. While plea 
deals do save time and money for the county and state, using the threat of a lengthy term of 
imprisonment to pressure a defendant to plead guilty to an offense has questionable 
constitutionality. 
Mandatory Minimums in Texas 
Texas has a record of having a strong criminal justice system, and in some ways, their 
system is reminiscent of the “tough-on-crime” era of the 1980’s when mandatory minimums 
were at their height. However, Texas’s penal code only uses a mandatory minimum penalty for 
the conviction of a capital felony. Texas Penal Code § 12.31 states:  
1)  a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory on conviction of the capital felony, if the 
individual committed the offense when younger than 18 years of age; or 
(2)  a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is mandatory on conviction of the 
capital felony, if the individual committed the offense when 18 years of age or older. 
Texas’s sentencing enhancements (i.e. habitual offender laws) do not carry mandatory 
minimums with them. They instead increase the felony charge similar to some of Nebraska’s 
practices regarding child pornography (Texas Penal Code § 12.425). The “habitual offender” will 
logically receive a greater sentence than they had previously received as the classification and 
severity has increased. Texas’s penal code still allows for judges to account for any unforeseen 
circumstances involving any one individual case. The context of the individual, charge, crime, or 
case may make the defendant underserving of a severe punishment in the eyes of the sentencing 
judge. An editorial by the Tyler Morning Telegraph, a newspaper located in Texas, criticized 
federal mandatory minimums and detailed why they do not exist in the state: 
Conservatives believe in local control and accountability - and these are best served by 
eliminating mandatory minimums. This is particularly true in Texas, where our judges are 
elected (not appointed). If we don’t like the sentences they hand down, we can let them 
know directly - at the ballot box (2017) 
Additionally, it should be noted that Texas is among the lowest in prison capacity in the nation; 
they were sitting at a comfortable 87.9% capacity in 2016, far below the threshold for 
overcrowding (Carson, 2018). Although, mandatory minimums cannot be confirmed as the cause 
of Texas’s low prison capacity.  
Mandatory Minimums in Alabama 
Alabama’s operationalization of mandatory minimums is similar to Nebraska’s 
definition. Alabama Code § 13A-12-232 states: 
 Any person who is found to have violated Section 13A-12-231, adjudication of guilt or 
imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such 
person be eligible for any type of parole, probation, work release, supervised intensive 
restitution program, release because of deduction from sentence for good behavior under 
corrections incentive time act or any other program, furlough, pass, leave, or any other 
type of early, conditional, or temporary release program, nor shall such person be 
permitted to leave the penitentiary for any reason whatsoever except for necessary court 
appearances and for necessary medical treatment, prior to serving the mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment prescribed in this article or 15 years, whichever is less. 
That is, anyone convicted of an offense that carries a mandatory minimum sentence is required 
serve the entirety of the mandatory minimum, or 15 years if the mandatory minimum is say 25 
years, before being eligible for parole.  
Alabama’s mandatory minimum penalties for drug trafficking are as follows (Alabama Code § 
13A-12-231): 
 For trafficking in cannabis, amphetamine, and methamphetamine: 
a. Is in excess of one kilo or 2.2 pounds, but less than 100 pounds, the person shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years 
b. Is 100 pounds or more, but less than 500 pounds, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five calendar years  
c. Is 500 pounds or more, but less than 1,000 pounds, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years  
d. Is 1,000 pounds or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of 
imprisonment of life without parole. 
For knowingly selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into Alabama 28 grams or 
more of any type of cocaine, the offense is referred to as “trafficking in cocaine”, and if 
the amount is: 
a. Is 28 grams or more, but less than 500 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years  
b. Is 500 grams or more, but less than one kilo, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five calendar years  
c. Is one kilo, but less than 10 kilos, then the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years  
d. Is 10 kilos or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment 
of life without parole. 
For knowingly selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into Alabama four grams 
or more of any type of morphine, opium, or any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, 
including heroin, or four grams or more of phencyclidine, or any mixture containing 
phencyclidine or four grams or more of lysergic acid diethylamide, of four grams or more 
of any mixture containing lysergic acid diethylamide, the offense is referred to as 
“trafficking in illegal drugs”, and if the amount is: 
a. Is four grams or more, but less than 14 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years  
b. Is 14 grams or more, but less than 28 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 10 calendar years  
c. Is 28 grams or more, but less than 56 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 calendar years  
d. Is 56 grams or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of 
imprisonment of life without parole. 
For knowingly selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into Alabama 1,000 or 
more pills or capsules of methaqualone, the offense is referred to as “trafficking in illegal 
drugs”, and if the amount is: 
a. Is 1,000 pills or capsules, but less than 5,000 pills or capsules, the person shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years  
b. Is 5,000 capsules or more, but less than 25,000 capsules, that person shall be 
imprisoned to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 10 calendar years  
c. Is 25,000 pills or more, but less than 100,000 pills or capsules, the person shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 calendar years  
d. Is 100,000 capsules or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of 
imprisonment of life without parole. 
For knowingly selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into Alabama of 500 or 
more pills or capsules of hydromorphone, the offense is referred to as “trafficking in 
illegal drugs”, and if the amount is: 
a. Is 500 pills or capsules or more but less than 1,000 pills or capsules, the person shall be 
sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of three calendar years  
b. Is 1,000 pills or capsules or more, but less than 4,000 pills or capsules, the person shall 
be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of 10 calendar years  
c. Is 4,000 pills or capsules or more but less than 10,000 pills or capsules, the person shall 
be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of 25 calendar years  
d. Is more than 10,000 pills or capsules, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
term of life in prison without parole. 
For knowingly selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into Alabama 28 grams or 
more of 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine, or of any mixture containing 3,4-
methylenedioxy amphetamine, the offense is referred to as “trafficking in illegal drugs”, 
and if the amount is: 
a. Is 28 grams or more, but less than 500 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years  
b. Is 500 grams or more, but less than one kilo, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five calendar years  
c. Is one kilo, but less than 10 kilos, then the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years  
d. Is 10 kilos or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment 
of life without parole. 
For knowingly selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into Alabama 28 grams or 
more of amphetamine or any mixture containing amphetamine, its salt, optical isomer, or 
salt of its optical isomer thereof, the offense is referred to as “trafficking in 
amphetamine”, and if the amount is: 
a. Is 28 grams or more but less than 500 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years  
b. Is 500 grams or more, but less than one kilo, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five calendar years  
c. Is one kilo but less than 10 kilos, then the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years  
d. Is 10 kilos or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment 
of life without parole. 
For knowingly selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into Alabama 28 grams or 
more of methamphetamine or any mixture containing methamphetamine, its salts, optical 
isomers, or salt of its optical isomers thereof, the offense is referred to as “trafficking in 
methamphetamine”, and if the amount is: 
a. Is 28 grams or more but less than 500 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years  
b. Is 500 grams or more, but less than one kilo, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of five calendar years  
c. Is one kilo but less than 10 kilos, then the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years 
d. Is 10 kilos or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment 
of life without parole. 
For knowingly selling, manufacturing, delivering, or bringing into Alabama 56 or more 
grams of a synthetic controlled substance or a synthetic controlled substance analogue, 
the offense is referred to as “trafficking in synthetic controlled substances”, and if the 
amount is: 
a. Is 56 grams or more, but less than 500 grams, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of three calendar years  
b. Is 500 grams or more, but less than 1 kilo, the person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 10 calendar years  
c. Is one kilo, but less than 10 kilos, then the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of 15 calendar years 
d. Is 10 kilos or more, the person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment 
of life without parole. 
 
The 2012 Judges’ Sentencing Reference Manual, the most recent version of Alabama’s 
judicial guide for circuit and district judges, details the remaining mandatory minimum penalties 
and sentencing enhancements. Citing Alabama Code §13A-12-233, the manual covers other 
enhancements for drug trafficking, including a mandatory minimum of 25 years imprisonment 
upon the first conviction of running a drug enterprise and a mandatory term of life without parole 
upon the second conviction. This section also details how a mandatory minimum can be waived 
if the offender “provides substantial assistance in the arrest or conviction of any accomplices, 
accessories, co-conspirators, or principals”; the reduction must be made by the district attorney 
and cannot apply to those facing life imprisonment, such as someone charged for the second time 
with running a drug enterprise (Alabama Sentencing Commission, 2012).  
For Class A Felonies involving child sex offenders, there is a minimum of a 20-year term 
of imprisonment. For Class B Felonies involving child sex offenders, there is a minimum of a 
10-year term of imprisonment. While these penalties do not have “mandatory” attached, 
Alabama Code §13A-5-6 and §13A-5-11 stipulate anyone convicted of these crimes are not 
eligible for probation, good time, parole, or split sentence. At its essence, these statutes act in 
almost identical fashion to mandatory minimums; judges must impose a prison sentence and the 
offender cannot be released early. However, this form of sentencing enhancement still leaves 
room for the judge to impose a shorter term of imprisonment if they deem it appropriate for the 
individual (Alabama Sentencing Commission, 2012). 
Alabama’s habitual felony offender law, found in Alabama Code §13A-5-9, only utilizes 
the term mandatory once; if an offender commits a Class A Felony and has three prior felony 
convictions, they will face mandatory imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. This is 
not technically a mandatory minimum as the judge cannot sentence the offender to a longer term 
of imprisonment; it is a mandatory sentence as it is the only option available to the sentencing 
judge.  
As shown above, most of Alabama’s mandatory minimum sentences are for drug crimes, 
specifically drug trafficking. For some of these drug crimes, such as the punishment for cocaine 
possession, Nebraska’s mandatory penalties are more severe than Alabama. For instance, a three-
year mandatory minimum in Nebraska is triggered when an offender is in possession of 10 grams 
of cocaine, versus the 28 grams of cocaine necessary for the same mandatory sentence in 
Alabama. That said, Nebraska does not have any mandatory terms of life imprisonment, and this 
particular penalty may be why Alabama is the only state with a more critical overcrowding 
problem; the state’s prisons were around 175.7% capacity in 2016 (Carson, 2018). Alabama 
policy makers have taken steps to reduce overcrowding, namely passing a bill in 2015 that 
created a Class D Felony meant to keep non-violent drug offenders out of prison (Yurkanin, 
2017). However, the mandatory minimum for fentanyl trafficking was added just two years later 
due to an uptick in fentanyl deaths, quickly counteracting the recent prison reform efforts. 
Criminal defense attorneys in Alabama, like Brian White, are concerned about this reactionary 
policy because it perpetuates “the same old idea that we're going to incarcerate and coerce our 
way into a drug free society and that battle has been waged and lost already” (Yurkanin, 2017). 
Similar to Nebraska, supporters of this new penalty believe it is working toward promoting 
public safety, by “put[ting] people behind bars who truly belong there” (Yurkanin, 2017) 
Mandatory Minimums in California 
While California does not include mandatory minimum terminology in their penal code, 
they do include a provision listing certain crimes where probation cannot be granted. This is 
similar to Nebraska’s operationalization of mandatory minimums without the prohibition from 
good time, parole, and shorter prison sentences where the judge deems it appropriate. Even still, 
the California code states “[e]xcept in unusual cases where the interests of justice would best be 
served if the person is granted probation” in the statute where offenses prohibited from probation 
are listed (California Penal Code § 1203 subd. (e)). So, unless there are unique circumstances, a 
judge cannot grant probation for the following offenses, as quoted from California Penal Code § 
1203 subd. (e):  
(1) . . . any person who has been convicted of arson, robbery, carjacking, burglary, 
burglary with explosives, rape with force or violence, torture, aggravated mayhem, 
murder, attempt to commit murder, trainwrecking, kidnapping, escape from the state 
prison, or a conspiracy to commit one or more of those crimes and who was armed with 
the weapon at either of those times. 
(2) Any person who used, or attempted to use, a deadly weapon upon a human being in 
connection with the perpetration of the crime of which he or she has been convicted. 
(3) Any person who willfully inflicted great bodily injury or torture in the perpetration of 
the crime of which he or she has been convicted. 
(4) Any person who has been previously convicted twice in this state of a felony or in any 
other place of a public offense which, if committed in this state, would have been 
punishable as a felony. 
(5) . . . any person who has been convicted of burglary with explosives, rape with force or 
violence, torture, aggravated mayhem, murder, attempt to commit murder, train 
wrecking, extortion, kidnapping, escape from the state prison, a violation of Section 286, 
288, 288a, or 288.5, or a conspiracy to commit one or more of those crimes. 
(6) Any person who has been previously convicted once in this state of a felony or in any 
other place of a public offense which, if committed in this state, would have been 
punishable as a felony, if he or she committed any of the following acts: 
(A) Unless the person had a lawful right to carry a deadly weapon at the time of 
the perpetration of the previous crime or his or her arrest for the previous crime, 
he or she was armed with a weapon at either of those times. 
(B) The person used, or attempted to use, a deadly weapon upon a human being in 
connection with the perpetration of the previous crime. 
(C) The person willfully inflicted great bodily injury or torture in the perpetration 
of the previous crime. 
(7) Any public official or peace officer of this state or any city, county, or other political 
subdivision who, in the discharge of the duties of his or her public office or employment, 
accepted or gave or offered to accept or give any bribe, embezzled public money, or was 
guilty of extortion. 
(8) Any person who knowingly furnishes or gives away phencyclidine [PCP]. 
(9) Any person who intentionally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of arson 
under subdivision (a) of Section 451 or who intentionally set fire to, burned, or caused 
the burning of, an inhabited structure or inhabited property in violation of subdivision (b) 
of Section 451. 
(10) Any person who, in the commission of a felony, inflicts great bodily injury or causes 
the death of a human being by the discharge of a firearm from or at an occupied motor 
vehicle proceeding on a public street or highway. 
(11) Any person who possesses a short-barreled rifle or a short-barreled shotgun under 
Section 33215, a machinegun under Section 32625, or a silencer under Section 33410. 
(12) Any person who is convicted of violating Section 8101 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code [supplying a deadly weapon to a prohibited person]. 
(13) Any person who is described in subdivision (b) or (c) of Section 27590 [including a 
previous conviction involving a hand gun or firearm, supplying a minor with a firearm, or 
an active participant of a criminal street gang].  
Though these are not mandatory minimums, it is still interesting to note there is only one 
mention of a drug offense in this section. An offender who commits a drug offense, besides 
supplying phencyclidine, can still potentially face the sentencing enhancement, unavailability of 
probation, if their offense also applies to one of the additional add-ons laid out above. For 
instance, if someone was convicted of selling cocaine while being in possession of a firearm, and 
they were charged for a second time with being in possession of methamphetamines, they would 
be subject to the punishment in this section (California Penal Code § 1203 subd. (e)(6A).  
In 2012, California saw its habitual criminal offender law change through Proposition 36. 
According to Ballotpedia, 69.3% of voters voted in favor of the new law. Proposition 36 is 
significant for three reasons: 
(1) [It] revise[d] the three strikes law to impose life sentence only when the new felony 
conviction is "serious or violent." 
(2) Authorize[d] re-sentencing for offenders currently serving life sentences [at the time] 
if their third strike conviction was not serious or violent and if the judge determine[d] 
that the re-sentence [would] not pose unreasonable risk to public safety. 
(3) Maintain[ed] the life sentence penalty for felons with ‘non-serious, non-violent third 
strike if prior convictions were for rape, murder, or child molestation’ (Ballotpedia, 
2012). 
The above aspects are written to reduce sentencing for non-violent offenders, while still 
maintaining severe sentencing for the most heinous crimes. The retroactive component of 
Proposition was designed to both reduce overcrowding in prisons and provide tax payer support; 
it was estimated that the proposition is saving California over $100 million every year (Voter 
Information Guide, 2012). In 2010, two years prior to the implementation of the proposition, 
California was at 153% average capacity, and in 2016, their prison population had been reduced 
to 111.5% capacity (Guerino, Harrison, and Sabol, 2011; Carson, 2018). It is probable that the 
implementation of Proposition 36 did have some effect on the overcrowding in California 
prisons.  
 Within California’s habitual criminal law for sexual offenders, the term “mandatory 
minimum” does not exist. California Penal Code § 667.71 (b) and (e) reads: 
(b) A habitual sexual offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 
25 years to life. . . .  
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, probation shall not be granted to, nor 
shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, any person who is subject 
to punishment under this section. 
Again, California’s penal code just prohibits the use of probation while leaving the potential for 
good time and parole in-tact. Unlike Nebraska, were prisoners are eligible for parole after 
serving 50% of their sentence, in California, offenders much serve 85% of their sentence before 
eligibility (Neb. Rev. Statutes § 83-1 (107); California Penal Code § 2933.1). This means that 
not including the prohibition of good time in their sentencing laws and enhancements does not 
have as large an effect as it would in Nebraska.   
Mandatory Minimum Policies in Federal Courts 
The federal penal code offers potential reliefs to mandatory minimum sentences. Similar 
to Alabama, federal courts have the ability to give a lower sentence if a “substantial assistance” 
mechanism is satisfied when “a defendant provides substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person” (Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) and 18 U.S.C § 3553 
as reported by The United States Sentencing Commission, 2011). In its 1986 inception, Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) gave the court full discretion and responsibility to determine 
and reduce an offender’s sentence within 120 days post sentencing (The United States 
Sentencing Commission, 2011). The Sentencing Reform Act amended this rule significantly, the 
Rule now reads: 
Upon the government’s motion made within one year of sentencing, the court may reduce 
a sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in 
investigating or prosecuting another person. . . . When acting under Rule 35(b), the court 
may reduce the sentence to a level below the minimum sentence established by statute 
(Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, 2009) 
The court now has to wait for a government actor to file a motion to reduce the sentence, but the 
allotted time to reduce the sentence has been increased by approximately nine months. Enacted 
as an amendment to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C § 3553 “grants a court limited authority 
to impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum penalty at the time of sentencing” (The 
United States Sentencing Commission, 2011).  The second mechanism for relief from mandatory 
minimum penalties is referred to as “the safety valve” and is housed under subsection (f) of 18 
U.S.C. § 3553. It states: 
the court shall impose a sentence pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the United States 
Sentencing Commission under section 994 of title 28 without regard to any statutory 
minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, after the Government has been 
afforded the opportunity to make a recommendation, that—  
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined under 
the sentencing guidelines;  
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm 
or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the 
offense;  
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;  
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the 
offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a 
continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 848; and  
(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully provided 
to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense 
or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, 
but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or 
that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a 
determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement (Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title VIII § 8001, 1994). 
Offenders have to meet all five criteria in order for the mandatory minimum sentence to be 
lowered.  
How mandatory minimum penalties have been handled in federal court has seen changes. 
Eric Holder, former United States Attorney General, issued a policy in 2013 outlining changes in 
prosecutorial discretion for federal attorneys. He wrote, citing Alleyne v United States to show 
the substantial prosecutorial role in mandatory minimums:  
Pursuant to my memorandum of May 19, 2010, prosecutors should continue to conduct 
‘an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the specific 
circumstances of the case. . .’  While this means that prosecutors ‘should ordinarily 
charge the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's 
conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction,’ the charges always should 
reflect an individualized assessment and fairly represent the defendant's criminal conduct. 
This first policy is call for mindful prosecutorial discretion; Eric Holder is asking the attorneys 
under his authority to look at each individual offender and use proper discretion to act in a fair 
capacity. He continued: 
in cases involving the applicability of Title 21 mandatory minimum sentences based on 
drug type and quantity, prosecutors should decline to charge the quantity necessary to 
trigger a mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant meets each of the following 
criteria: 
The defendant's relevant conduct does not involve the use of violence, the credible threat 
of violence, the possession of a weapon, the trafficking of drugs to or with minors, or the 
death or serious bodily injury of any person; 
The defendant is not an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor of others within a 
criminal organization; 
The defendant does not have significant ties to large-scale drug trafficking organizations, 
gangs, or cartels; and 
The defendant does not have a significant criminal history. A significant criminal history 
will normally be evidenced by three or more criminal history points but may involve 
fewer or greater depending on the nature of any prior convictions (2013). 
This second part takes a similar approach to the “safety valve” relief mechanism discussed 
earlier, though this memorandum works for prosecutorial discretion versus the judicial discretion 
mechanism of the “safety valve”. Because Congress would not repeal mandatory minimum 
sentences in Title 21, Holder decided to send out this memorandum telling his prosecutors not to 
charge any defendant with an offense that carries one of these mandatory minimums, effectively 
nullifying these sentencing laws. He chose to use his ability to influence prosecutorial discretion 
to change the impact of legislation. Another former United States Attorney General, Jeff 
Sessions, took a opposite stance on prosecutorial power and disagreed with Holder’s policy to 
not pursue the highest applicable charge. Jeff sessions has spoken in favor of mandatory 
minimum sentencing guidelines on multiple occasions. He believes his advocation for mandatory 
minimum penalties and longer terms of imprisonment have “empowered our prosecutors to 
charge and pursue the most serious offense as I believe the law requires - most serious readily 
provable offense” and added that this strong prosecutorial action “is simply the right and moral 
thing to do” (NPR, 2017). Holder, on the opposite end, feels “[i]n some cases,” he stated in his 
memorandum, “mandatory minimum and recidivist enhancement statutes have resulted in unduly 
harsh sentences and perceived or actual disparities” (2013).  
 Another section of Eric Holder’s policy changing memorandum, regarding advocacy of 
the “safety valve”, was as follows:  
Prosecutors also should continue to accurately calculate the sentencing range under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines. In cases where the properly calculated guideline 
range meets or exceeds the mandatory minimum, prosecutors should consider whether a 
below-guidelines sentence is sufficient to satisfy the purposes of sentencing as set forth in 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In determining the appropriate sentence to recommend to the Court, 
prosecutors should consider whether the defendant truthfully and in a timely way 
provided to the Government all information the defendant has concerning the offense or 
offenses that were part of the same course of conduct, common scheme, or plan (2013) 
This section was meant to draw prosecutors’ attention to the “safety valve” function of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553. His aim was to make attorneys aware and push for them to advocate for and consider this 
relief for each case where a defendant faced a mandatory minimum penalty. In his final section, 
Holder writes: 
Prosecutors should decline to file an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 unless the 
defendant is involved in conduct that makes the case appropriate for severe sanctions. 
When determining whether an enhancement is appropriate, prosecutors should consider 
the following factors: 
Whether the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager or supervisor of others within a 
criminal organization; 
Whether the defendant was involved in the use or threat of violence in connection with 
the offense; 
The nature of the defendant's criminal history, including any prior history of violent 
conduct or recent prior convictions for serious offenses; 
Whether the defendant has significant ties to large-scale drug trafficking organizations, 
gangs, or cartels; 
Whether the filing would create a gross sentencing disparity with equally or more 
culpable co-defendants; and 
Other case-specific aggravating or mitigating factors.  
 
The “information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851” refers to the prosecutor’s role in establishing 
prior convictions in illegal drug hearings and trials that cause increased sentencing 
enhancements, such as mandatory minimums. The statute is as follows: 
 
No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to 
increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or 
before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the 
court (21 U.S.C. § 851 (a)(1)) 
This statute means in order for a sentencing enhancement, which generally includes a lengthier 
prison sentence, to be placed on a drug crime detailed within Title 21, the United States Attorney 
must be the one to file information regarding the defendant’s prior conviction or convictions. 
Eric Holder appealed to prosecutors to not file this information unless they deem it appropriate 
and necessary—based on the considerations he laid out. 
Discussion: Next Steps for Nebraska 
Mandatory minimums in Nebraska leave themselves open to a simple, but strong 
criticism. Though, as the Attorney General, Doug Peterson, and the Criminal Bureau Chief of the 
Nebraska Attorney General's Office, Corey O’Brien have argued, mandatory minimums aim to 
target the most severe crimes, such as child sexual assault, there are discrepancies within the 
offenses that carry mandatory minimum penalties. While being in possession of 28 grams of 
cocaine or heroin or meth ensures a mandatory minimum penalty of a five-year term of 
imprisonment without the opportunity for parole, being in possession of 140 grams of any of 
those illegal drugs does not constitute a mandatory minimum penalty. The former is a Class IC 
Felony which has a mandatory minimum, with the latter is a Class IB Felony which hold a higher 
minimum (20-year term of imprisonment), but as it is not mandatory, the offender facing that 
charge could potentially be granted probation or a lesser sentence (Neb. Rev. Statutes § 28-105). 
That is not to say they would be granted probation, but it would be up to the judge to consider 
everything and make an informed judgment in the name of justice. Even if the judge decided to 
sentence this hypothetical offender to 20 years in prison for a IB felony drug conviction, that 
offender is eligible to obtain good time. Logically, they would act accordingly in order to ensure 
an early parole. This was the management function of good time detailed by Senator Chambers 
that is lost with mandatory minimum penalties.  
Another disparity along the same lines, but with a violent crime, comes from the statute 
for first-degree sexual assault. Sexual assault is a Class II Felony which carries a minimum term 
of one-year in prison (Neb. Rev. Statutes §23-319 and § 28-105). If prosecutors and law 
enforcement are keen on pursuing violent crimes with mandatory minimum penalties and truly 
do not care about drug offenses, then the question of why sexual assault does not have a 
mandatory minimum but being in possession of 28 grams of cocaine requires a five-year prison 
sentence needs to be addressed. During the Judiciary Committee hearing in 2017, Senator Baker 
asked Ernie Chambers why certain Class II felonies, such as human trafficking, do not have 
mandatory minimums, but certain drug crimes do. Senator Chambers responded that he did not 
know and referred to the sentencing laws as “irrational” (Judiciary Committee, 2017). Mandatory 
minimums penalties need to be tackled and changed through passable legislation in Nebraska. As 
seen throughout recent legislative sessions, reactions to bills similar to LB 447 have remained 
consistent and opposed by the majority. Unfortunately, enacting policy change through 
prosecutorial discretion similar to Eric Holder’s memorandum is unlikely as the opinion of 
Nebraska’s Attorney General are clear and very much in opposition to the previous United States 
Attorney General.  
Texas’s practices should be considered when thinking about Nebraska’s next steps, 
especially as they are well below 100% capacity in their prisons. Though Texas is viewed as 
having one of the harsher criminal justice systems in the nation, its sentencing enhancements and 
use of mandatory minimums are almost downright progressive. Texas has invoked a system 
rooted deeply in trust of judicial discretion. The editorial written by the Tyler Morning Telegraph 
detailed how this power should remain with judges in Texas because they are elected into office 
and can be held accountable for their actions (2017). Whereas prosecutors are appointed by a 
government actor, and the public has little to no say on their continued work in that position. 
This leaves little room for the public to identify and take actions toward the culpable person.  
Texas is not the only entity to agree with judicial power trumping prosecutorial 
discretion. The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation wrote in reference to the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act and the mandatory minimums that it created, “[i]n essence, Congress abandoned the idea that 
Federal judges -- appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate -- have the 
wisdom and training to identify the most serious drug offenders and punish them appropriately” 
(n.d.). They feel judges have the proper training, and therefore ability, to make a fair and 
unbiased decision regarding the proper sentence for a certain offense. In Nebraska, judges are 
trusted with handling the sentencing of most higher level, Class IB Felonies, as they tend to only 
carry a minimum guideline. Nebraska law makers need to consider judicial retention elections 
during their deliberations on getting rid of mandatory minimums and restoring power to judges. 
If Nebraskans are truly concerned about certain judges granting probation to offenders who 
would be in prison with a mandatory minimum penalty, they have the option to not vote for those 
judges the following election. In the most recent election alone, there were 32 judges up for 
retention in Nebraska (State of Nebraska Judicial Branch, 2018).  
With regards to Alabama’s policy, Nebraska should look to their penal code to 
understand the unforeseen consequences of extensive mandatory minimums for non-violent drug 
crimes and reactionary legislation. Alabama’s additional mandatory minimums for trafficking in 
fentanyl has made many in the state weary of this reactionary legislation, especially during a 
time where policy makers are working towards criminal justice reform and the reduction of 
overcrowding in prisons. Sarah Harkless, with the Wellness Coalition, detailed Alabama’s opioid 
epidemic. Citing the 2015 National Household Survey on Drug Use and Health, she found 
Alabama made up five percent of the United States’ population but uses about 80% of opioid 
drugs, including fentanyl (Harkless, 2016). In Jefferson County, the largest county in Alabama 
and home to Birmingham, deaths caused by fentanyl overdose went from 14 in 2012 to 74 in 
2015 to almost 200 in 2016 (Harkless, 2016; Yurkanin, 2017). State Senator Cam Ward, who 
sponsored the bill regarding fentanyl use, called for quick passage, citing the urgency of the 
problem (Yurkanin, 2017). In the same article, Johnathan Caulkins, a drug policy expert and 
professor at Carnegie Mellon University, was interviewed and noted how the opioid epidemic 
was a “terrifying” and “horrific” problem (Yurkanin, 2017). However, he also made clear how 
sentencing laws, such as mandatory minimums or other enhancements, rarely reduce drug use 
and trafficking. He explained by saying that “it is easy to replace drug dealers imprisoned for 
long periods of time . . . the people supplying [drugs] will find someone willing to risk prison to 
make money” (Yurkanin, 2017). Caulkins refers to this type of drug crime as “consensual crime” 
and states they are a “function of demand”; “[d]emand is the summation of the tastes and 
preferences of hundreds of millions of potential consumers, not a policy variable which the 
government can easily control” (Caulkins and Reuter, 1997). This idea means that while criminal 
sanctions, such as mandatory minimum penalties, can disturb the cycle of drug trafficking, it has 
little long-term effect. Caulkins recommends, instead of implementing reactionary sentencing 
policies, that “states should focus on strategies to decrease the number of new addicts, which 
could include outreach to the medical community to reduce opioid prescriptions that can lead to 
heroin use” (Yurkanin, 2017). 
There is no current push in Nebraska for incorporating additional mandatory minimum 
penalties into the penal code. However, within the current public safety discourse, there is 
continued fear of predators and other violent offenders. Nebraska law makers should be weary of 
potential reactionary legislation based in emotional appeals and void of thorough questioning, 
such as the Anti-Drug Abuse Act. Deliberation is always recommended for proper and 
appropriate legislation, especially in Nebraska’s unicameral system where there are less steps 
required for passage.  
Nebraska and California’s use of mandatory minimums are poles apart, although, 
Nebraska did have a recent bill reminiscent of Proposition 36. Introduced by State Senator Patty 
Pansing Brooks during the 2018 legislative session, LB 1013 was drafted to limit Nebraska’s 
habitual criminal enhancement to only apply to violent felonies. The statement of intent was as 
follows:  
Current statute states that whoever has been twice convicted of a felony crime, sentenced 
and committed to prison for more than one year, shall upon conviction of a felony, be 
deemed to be a habitual criminal and shall be punished with mandatory minimum 
penalties. LB1013 keeps the habitual criminal statute but limits its application to violent 
felonies only (Pansing Brooks, 2018). 
In her introduction during a 2018 Judiciary Committee hearing, Pansing Brooks told the story of 
one Nebraska offender: 
In 2014, we had a woman convicted of one criminal conviction, criminal possession of a 
financial transaction device; two, shoplifting; and three, second-degree forgery. She was 
given a flat sentence of ten to ten years. I would argue that this was a significant waste of 
state dollars. LB1013 would allow the habitual criminal law to apply only to serious and 
violent felonies and certainly not forgery. 
As discussed earlier, California’s Proposition 36 was predicted to save the state an annual 
amount of approximately $100 million dollars. Since Nebraska is a significantly smaller state 
than California, and therefore has a smaller criminal justice system, the potential savings would 
not be near this amount, but could still be noteworthy. LB 1013 was indefinitely postponed in 
2018 but could be reinvigorated in the future. Policy makers should look at Propositions 36’s 
retroactive aspect for additional ways to save tax dollars.  
As far as California’s lack of using mandatory rhetoric within their penal code, it is 
important to note the state still calls for prison time for serious crimes. Their criminal justice 
system is not acting in a merely lenient fashion, instead, California has analyzed which crimes 
are the most severe and harmful and save prison sentences for those offenses. Their section 
detailing what crimes cannot be granted probation could be applied to Nebraska’s penal code. 
Corey O’Brein and others who support the use of mandatory minimums have stated their concern 
for the possibility of judges granting probation to violent offenders and those offenders 
immediately being released back in the community (Judiciary Committee, 2017). Changing the 
penal code to state the prohibition of probation for offenses which currently have mandatory 
minimums would satisfy this concern. These offenders would not be granted probation and 
would therefore be deterred from committing additional offenses during their period of 
imprisonment. This would also solve Ernie Chamber’s worry about parole and the inability of 
Class ID and IC offenders, as well as other offenders serving mandatory minimum sentence, to 
obtain good time. Under a statute similar to California’s code, offenders not granted probation 
would still have the opportunity to be granted parole. Not only does parole save the state money, 
as Nebraska does not have to continue to pay the expensive living costs of released inmates, it 
also promotes good behavior and a collaborative prison system (Polinsky, 2015). Moreover, as 
Fran Kaye advocated, lengthy prison sentences do more harm than good. She argued, “the most 
important thing that long sentences do is completely destabilize people, break them away from 
their family and community, and make it much, much harder for them to get or keep jobs when 
they come out” (Kaye, F., personal communication, February 23, 2017). Other research has 
identified the importance of maintaining strong familial ties and interpersonal relationships for 
the reduction of the likelihood of reoffending and easing the process of reentering the 
community, post-offense (Hariston, 1991). This idea was held up by another study that found 
evidence of a “reduction in rule-breaking behavior” after a prisoner received a visit from family 
members; this suggests the existence positive effect of being around family on criminal behavior 
(Claire and Dixon, 2017). Maintaining personal relationships is easier when an offender is 
granted probation or another form of community supervision, as their family and friends do not 
have to go to a prison in order to have a meaningful interaction. Furthermore, those granted 
probation are still held responsible for their actions, but they do not have to go through a 
reintegration process where they face stigma and negative reactions from their community. For 
these reasons, the Nebraska legislature should consider following California’s lead by including 
a provision where in unusual cases, judges should have the ability to grant probation to 
offenders, as long as the judgement is in the interest of pursuing justice (California Penal Code § 
12o3 subd. (e)).  
The terminology “unusual cases” may be too vague for Nebraska’s penal code, so, as to 
provide clear judicial instruction, another recommendation would be to follow the “safety valve” 
mechanism of the federal penal code for mandatory minimums. To reiterate, an offender can be 
given a penalty below the designated mandatory minimum if they meet five criteria: 
(1) the defendant does not have more than 1 criminal history point, as determined under 
the sentencing guidelines;  
(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm 
or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the 
offense;  
(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;  
(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the 
offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not engaged in a 
continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. 848; and  
 (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully 
provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning 
the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common 
scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information 
to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information shall not preclude a 
determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement (Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title VIII § 8001, 1994). 
This relief mechanism supports the idea that not every offender who commits the same offense is 
equal and some form of review is necessary for proper sentencing to occur. However, a 
recommended change would be to give the responsibility of reviewing these criteria to judges 
rather than prosecutors. Attorney General Eric Holder had to remind and call for United States 
prosecutors to review these criteria for each case where a mandatory minimum penalty was 
attached. If it was the duty of prosecutors in Nebraska to file motions for lower sentences, it is 
reasonable to assume they would rarely act in this capacity. Especially since Nebraska Attorney 
General Doug Peterson does not share Eric Holder’s opinion. It is unlikely he would call for 
attorneys to review these criteria for mandatory minimum cases and file motions whenever 
possible. This responsibility should be left to judges who already review individual 
circumstances, such as these five criteria, for other offense sentences without mandatory 
minimum penalties. With the issue of mandatory minimum reform, the debate often boils down 
to who to trust with discretion: judges or prosecutors. In Nebraska, since judges are elected 
officials, it is democratic to give more responsibility and clout to judges who can be held 
accountable by the public. 
 The next steps for Nebraska, with regard to mandatory minimum sentences, could go in a 
variety of directions. Law makers could follow in the steps of Texas and California and rid the 
penal code of mandatory minimum language to allow for a system entrenched in judicial 
discretion. If this is too open for comfort, they should consider prohibiting probation for certain 
crimes or felony classification, similar to California’s penal code. Or Nebraska could adopt the 
federal system of using a “safety valve” relief mechanism that allows for discretion while 
maintaining clear guidelines and requirements. As for the mandatory minimums attached to 
habitual criminal laws, Senator Pansing Brooks bill, LB 1013, or one similar to California’s 
Proposition 36, should be reconsidered by the Nebraska legislature. The current sentencing 
statutes are misaligned with the rest of the nation; not even Alabama with one of the harshest 
penal codes in the United States, uses mandatory minimums for their habitual criminal statutes. 
Finally, it needs to be reiterated that Nebraska should watch out for any reactionary legislation to 
certain offenses.; as seen by Alabama’s mandatory minimum bill regarding trafficking in 
fentanyl, this type of legislation just costs the state money and puts non-violent offenders in 
prison for longer.   
following 
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